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» On the Evolution of Selfish Routing
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CONEXT
2007
ACM
14 years 16 days ago
Internet economics: the use of Shapley value for ISP settlement
Within the current Internet, autonomous ISPs implement bilateral agreements, with each ISP establishing agreements that suit its own local objective to maximize its profit. Peerin...
Richard T. B. Ma, Dah-Ming Chiu, John C. S. Lui, V...
SIGMETRICS
2008
ACM
13 years 8 months ago
Managing inter-domain traffic in the presence of bittorrent file-sharing
Overlay routing operating in a selfish manner is known to cause undesired instability when it interacts with native layer routing. We observe similar selfish behavior with the Bit...
Srinivasan Seetharaman, Mostafa H. Ammar
WINE
2010
Springer
177views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 6 months ago
Braess's Paradox in Large Sparse Graphs
Braess's paradox, in its original context, is the counter-intuitive observation that, without lessening demand, closing roads can improve traffic flow. With the explosion of d...
Fan Chung, Stephen J. Young
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
13 years 1 days ago
A real-time multicast routing scheme for multi-hop switched fieldbuses
—The rapid scaling up of Networked Control Systems (NCS) is forcing traditional single-hop shared medium industrial fieldbuses (a.k.a. fieldbuses) to evolve toward multi-hop sw...
Lixiong Chen, Xue Liu, Qixin Wang, Yufei Wang
INFOCOM
2006
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks
—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
Ron Banner, Ariel Orda