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» On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
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STACS
2004
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 4 months ago
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
LATIN
2010
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
The Power of Fair Pricing Mechanisms
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron...
CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 11 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng