We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...