In this paper, we propose a new design methodology to assess the risk for side-channel attacks, more specifically timing analysis and simple power analysis, at an early design st...
Kazuo Sakiyama, Elke De Mulder, Bart Preneel, Ingr...
Abstract. Although cryptographic implementation tasks are often undertaken by expert programmers, a plethora of performance and security driven options, as well as more mundane sof...
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives with unconditional security, assuming that the adversary’s quantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivious ...
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives with unconditional security, assuming that the adversary's quantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivio...
The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines. However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also co...