Despite the large amounts of runtime needed to adequately solve a combinatorial auction (CA), existing iterative CA auction protocols require winner determination during every rou...
Ryan Kastner, Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, ...
Combinatorial auctions are difficult to analyze in part because of the vast number of potential strategies available to the bidders. Proxy bidding interfaces limit the users’ s...
Peter R. Wurman, Gangshu Cai, Jie Zhong, Ashish Su...
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...