A key solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. The core of an expense sharing game contains stable allocations of the total cost to the participating players, such ...
Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschei...
Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficien...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
We consider the standard model of finite two-person zero-sum stochastic games with signals. We are interested in the existence of almost-surely winning or positively winning stra...
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...