20 search results - page 1 / 4 » On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation |
PODC
2004
ACM
14 years 12 days ago
2004
ACM
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
Following Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4], we study single-call mechanisms — truthful mechanisms that evaluate an allocation function only once per instantiation. First, w...