The paper a discusses the interaction properties between preference and choice of coalitions in a strategic interaction. A language is presented to talk about the conflict between...
Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, ...
In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such ga...
We study the logical definablity of the winning regions of parity games. For games with a bounded number of priorities, it is wellknown that the winning regions are definable in th...
In this paper we show how coalition logic can be reduced to the fusion of a normal modal STIT logic for agency and a standard normal temporal logic for discrete time, and how this...
Fair allocation of payoffs among cooperating players who can form various coalitions of differing utilities is the classic game theoretic “coalition problem.” Shapley’s va...