We study the online ad-auctions problem introduced by Mehta et. al. [15]. We design a (1 − 1/e)competitive (optimal) algorithm for the problem, which is based on a clean primal-...
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
We present the design of a banner advertising auction which is considerably more expressive than current designs. We describe a general model of expressive ad contracts/bidding an...
Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm,...
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
Given a large online network of online auction users and their histories of transactions, how can we spot anomalies and auction fraud? This paper describes the design and implemen...
Shashank Pandit, Duen Horng Chau, Samuel Wang, Chr...