General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on alg...
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...