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SIGECOM
2000
ACM
127views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2000»
14 years 3 months ago
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
General combinatorial auctions—auctions in which bidders place unrestricted bids for bundles of goods—are the subject of increasing study. Much of this work has focused on alg...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Mark Pearson, Yoav Shoham
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
13 years 2 months ago
Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
ATAL
2008
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 4 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms
This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidd...
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori...