We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
Enrico Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen,...
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential au...
We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...