The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good ...
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
This paper identifies five distinct mechanisms by which a population-based algorithm might have an advantage over a solo-search algorithm in classical optimization. These mechanism...
In this paper four mechanisms, fine and coarse grained fitness rating, linguistic evaluation and active user intervention are compared for use in the multi-objective IGA. The inte...