We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ļ¬...
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to speciļ¬c instances of a decision scenario...
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of eļ¬cient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...
Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with ...
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, Mic...
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...