170 search results - page 12 / 34 » Parallel Computation of Nash Equilibria in N-Player Games |
ICALP
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
ICML
2003
IEEE
14 years 8 months ago
2003
IEEE
Learning in many multi-agent settings is inherently repeated play. This calls into question the naive application of single play Nash equilibria in multi-agent learning and sugges...
IPL
2006
13 years 7 months ago
2006
We present a Coq-formalised proof that all non-cooperative, sequential games have a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof methodology follows the style advocated by LCFstyle theorem p...
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2006
ACM
Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying...