We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
In a yes/no voting game, a set of voters must determine whether to accept or reject a given alternative. Weighted voting games are a well-studied subclass of yes/no voting games, ...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
We consider PAC learning of simple cooperative games, in which the coalitions are partitioned into "winning" and "losing" coalitions. We analyze the complexity...
Coalition formation is a problem of great interest in AI, allowing groups of autonomous, rational agents to form stable teams. Furthermore, the study of coalitional stability conc...
Abstract. Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can co...
Edith Elkind, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Nicholas R. J...