A. Falappa, an Abstract Dialogue Framework Guillermo R. Simari Regular Helena Kein¨anen An Algorithm for Generating Nash Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games 15:30-16:00 A...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
We study an update operator for Coalition Logic to talk about the way players' strategic ability changes because of the moves of their opponents. We show its connection with D...
Jan Broersen, Rosja Mastop, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, ...
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
Abstract. We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest ...