We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
We provide efficient algorithms for finding approximate BayesNash equilibria (BNE) in graphical, specifically tree, games of incomplete information. In such games an agent’s p...
Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman
Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
We present a technique for reducing a normal-form (aka. (bi)matrix) game, O, to a smaller normal-form game, R, for the purpose of computing a Nash equilibrium. This is done by com...
We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria an...