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» Pricing Rule in a Clock Auction
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AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
Maher Said
ECAI
2008
Springer
14 years 19 days ago
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 12 months ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
Efficient agents for cliff-edge environments with a large set of decision options
This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in on...
Ron Katz, Sarit Kraus
MAM
2007
157views more  MAM 2007»
13 years 10 months ago
Executing large algorithms on low-capacity FPGAs using flowpath partitioning and runtime reconfiguration
This paper describes a new method of executing a software program on an FPGA for embedded systems. Rather than combine reconfigurable logic with a microprocessor core, this method...
Darrin M. Hanna, Michael DuChene