ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in on...
This paper describes a new method of executing a software program on an FPGA for embedded systems. Rather than combine reconfigurable logic with a microprocessor core, this method...