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» Pricing and Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks
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NETCOOP
2009
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Understanding and Preventing Tacit Collusion among Telecommunication Operators
Abstract. Modeling the competition among telecommunication operators (or providers) as a repeated game may explain why tacit collusion to maintain high charging prices can be obser...
Patrick Maillé, Maurizio Naldi, Bruno Tuffi...
CDC
2008
IEEE
153views Control Systems» more  CDC 2008»
14 years 1 months ago
A stackelberg game for pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks
— We study the problem of pricing uplink power in wide-band cognitive radio networks under the objective of revenue maximization for the service provider and while ensuring incen...
Ashraf Al Daoud, Tansu Alpcan, Sachin Kumar Agarwa...
INFOCOM
2010
IEEE
13 years 5 months ago
Wireless Network Virtualization as A Sequential Auction Game
—We propose a virtualization framework to separate the network operator (NO) who focuses on wireless resource management and service providers (SP) who target distinct objectives...
Fangwen Fu, Ulas C. Kozat
ATMOS
2008
101views Optimization» more  ATMOS 2008»
13 years 9 months ago
Robust Line Planning under Unknown Incentives and Elasticity of Frequencies
The problem of robust line planning requests for a set of origin-destination paths (lines) along with their traffic rates (frequencies) in an underlying railway network infrastruct...
Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Christos D. Zaroliagis
WINE
2005
Springer
161views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 26 days ago
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari