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» Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
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STOC
2002
ACM
111views Algorithms» more  STOC 2002»
14 years 7 months ago
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experie...
Tim Roughgarden
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 4 months ago
A New Look at Selfish Routing
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
Christos Papadimitriou, Gregory Valiant
SODA
2004
ACM
118views Algorithms» more  SODA 2004»
13 years 8 months ago
The maximum latency of selfish routing
We give several new upper and lower bounds on the worst-case severity of Braess's Paradox and the price of anarchy of selfish routing with respect to the maximum latency obje...
Tim Roughgarden
JSAC
2008
135views more  JSAC 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
In order to fully utilize scarce spectrum resources, dynamic spectrum allocation becomes a promising approach to increase the spectrum efficiency for wireless networks. However, th...
Zhu Ji, K. J. Ray Liu
COCOON
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
On the Performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games
: Network games play a fundamental role in understanding behavior in many domains, ranging from communication networks through markets to social networks. Such networks are used, a...
Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero ...