241 search results - page 10 / 49 » Private Capacities in Mechanism Design |
GCA
2007
13 years 8 months ago
2007
On-Demand Computing fulfills the need of computing availability at limited hardware and software costs. Distributed systems of this kind typically store user files in a shared ...
SODA
2010
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
2010
ACM
We consider robust network design problems where the set of feasible demands may be given by an arbitrary polytope or convex body more generally. This model, introduced by BenAmeu...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
PODC
2004
ACM
14 years 24 days ago
2004
ACM
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2009
ACM
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...