Sciweavers

241 search results - page 4 / 49
» Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
Sort
View
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
103views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 7 months ago
Mechanism design over discrete domains
Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our mai...
Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
AAAI
2010
13 years 8 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 18 days ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ACMICEC
2006
ACM
152views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2006»
14 years 1 months ago
Capacity allocation with competitive retailers
This paper addresses a problem in supply chain management that how scarce resources can be efficiently allocated among competing interests. We present a formal model of allocation...
Masabumi Furuhata, Dongmo Zhang
SOFSEM
2009
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures
Abstract. Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multiagent systems despite private information, self-i...
David C. Parkes