We describe CSAR, a novel technique for generating cryptographically strong, accountable randomness. Using CSAR, we can generate a pseudo-random sequence and a proof that the elem...
Michael Backes, Peter Druschel, Andreas Haeberlen,...
In this paper, we introduce a new security property which intends to capture the ability of a cryptographic protocol being resistant to denial of service. This property, called im...
In this paper, we define and explore proofs of retrievability (PORs). A POR scheme enables an archive or back-up service (prover) to produce a concise proof that a user (verifier...
Abstract. This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first ord...
Meadows recently proposed a formal cost-based framework for analysis of denial of service. It was showed how some principles that have already been used to make cryptographic prot...