In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of prin...
We show how some classical static analyses for imperative programs, and the optimizing transformations which they enable, may be expressed and proved correct using elementary logi...
A recent development in formal security protocol analysis is the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL). We identify a number of problems with this logic as well as with extensions of t...
Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the "Dolev-Yao model." In this paper, we use a multiset re...
Iliano Cervesato, Nancy A. Durgin, Patrick Lincoln...
This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Dusko ...