In this paper we present a protocol for unlinkable communication, i.e. where an attacker cannot map the sender and receiver node of a communication. Existing anonymity protocols e...
Volker Fusenig, Eugen Staab, Uli Sorger, Thomas En...
In this paper, we address issues related to flow correlation attacks and the corresponding countermeasures in mix networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication s...
Ye Zhu, Xinwen Fu, Bryan Graham, Riccardo Bettati,...
An all too real threat to the privacy offered by a mix network is that individual mix administrators may volunteer partial tracing information to a coercer. While this threat can ...
XiaoFeng Wang, Philippe Golle, Markus Jakobsson, A...
Location-hidden services, as offered by anonymity systems such as Tor, allow servers to be operated under a pseudonym. As Tor is an overlay network, servers hosting hidden service...
A network latency estimation scheme associates a "position" to every peer in a distributed network such that the latency between any two nodes can be accurately estimate...