26 search results - page 4 / 6 » Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions |
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
AI
2002
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 5 months ago
2010
Tsinghua U.
feuse of its devstting eets in utions nd other mehnismsD ollusion is prohiited nd leglly proseutedF etD olluders hve lwys existedD nd my ontinue to existF e thus rise the followin...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
FOCS
2008
IEEE
13 years 8 months ago
2008
IEEE
In this paper we consider the following maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem: Given a set of m indivisible items and n agents; each agent i willing to pay bij on item j and w...