ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
In this paper we describe an analysis of two double auction markets— the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. The complexity of these institutions is such th...
Auctions are promising decentralized methods for teams of agents to allocate and re-allocate tasks among themselves in dynamic, partially known and time-constrained domains with p...
Online auctions have become extremely popular in recent years. Ability to predict winning bid prices accurately can help bidders to maximize their profit. This paper proposes a nu...
We consider the problem of resource allocation and scheduling where information and decisions are decentralized, and our goal is to propose a market mechanism that allows resource...