— The assignment problem constitutes one of the fundamental problems in the context of linear programming. Besides its theoretical significance, its frequent appearance in the a...
Michael M. Zavlanos, Leonid Spesivtsev, George J. ...
In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent...
Auctions are useful mechanisms for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders know their own valua...
As the use of automated negotiations becomes more mainstream, one key attribute that needs to be incorporated is a measure of a seller’s trust or reliability. In this paper, we ...
Guruprasad Airy, Po-Chun Chen, Tracy Mullen, John ...
We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design all...