361 search results - page 48 / 73 » Risk-averse auction agents |
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 29 days ago
2004
Springer
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on th...