We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
Motivated by the emergence of auction-based marketplaces for display ads such as the Right Media Exchange, we study the design of a bidding agent that implements a display adverti...
Arpita Ghosh, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein, Sergei Va...
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
Multi-agent learning is a crucial method to control or find solutions for systems, in which more than one entity needs to be adaptive. In today's interconnected world, such s...
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...