Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in t...
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
This paper presents new clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with piecewise linear demand/supply functions. We analyse the complexi...
We present and implement an infrastructure for automating the negotiation of business contracts. Underlying our system is a declarative language for both (1) fully-specified, exe...
Daniel M. Reeves, Michael P. Wellman, Benjamin N. ...
This paper addresses the issue of developing agents capable of participating in several potentially simultaneous auctions of different kinds (English, First-Price, Vickrey), with ...
Marlon Dumas, Guido Governatori, Arthur H. M. ter ...