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» Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions
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CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 8 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
IPCO
2007
108views Optimization» more  IPCO 2007»
13 years 10 months ago
Robust Combinatorial Optimization with Exponential Scenarios
Following the well-studied two-stage optimization framework for stochastic optimization [15, 18], we study approximation algorithms for robust two-stage optimization problems with ...
Uriel Feige, Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian, Vahab S...
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 3 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish