This paper deals with problems which fall into the domain of selfish scheduling: a protocol is in charge of building a schedule for a set of tasks without directly knowing their l...
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in or...
To address coordination and complexity issues, we formulate a grid task allocation problem as a bargaining based self-adaptive auction and propose the BarSAA grid task-bundle alloc...
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina ...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...