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SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 28 days ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2004
13 years 9 months ago
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sand...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
14 years 24 days ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
AAAI
2008
13 years 9 months ago
A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms
A key trend in (electronic) commerce is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the mechanisms that mediate interactions. We develop a theory that ties the expressiveness ...
Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm
ALDT
2009
Springer
172views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
Traditional performance analysis of approximation algorithms considers overall performance, while economic fairness analysis focuses on the individual performance each user receiv...
Ahuva Mu'alem