3 search results - page 1 / 1 » Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitori... |
MOR
2007
13 years 10 months ago
2007
We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off fo...
COLT
2003
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
2003
Springer
We study on-line play of repeated matrix games in which the observations of past actions of the other player and the obtained reward are partial and stochastic. We define the Part...
NIPS
2003
14 years 7 days ago
2003
We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focu...