We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies the security of these ...
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched during the last 25 years. Several formalisms and (semi-)automatic tools for the ver...
This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Dusko ...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysi...
Suzana Andova, Cas J. F. Cremers, Kristian Gj&osla...
A recent development in formal security protocol analysis is the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL). We identify a number of problems with this logic as well as with extensions of t...