We describe a novel method for verifying programs that manipulate linked lists, based on two new predicates that characterize reachability of heap cells. These predicates allow re...
We present a general unwinding framework for the definition of information flow security properties of concurrent programs, described in a simple imperative language enriched wi...
This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Dusko ...
This material was presented in a series of lectures at fosad, a summer school on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design, at the University of Bologna Center at Bertinoro in Se...
Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols have been frequently reported in the literature. Heather et al. and Guttman et al. proved that these could be pr...