Strand space analysis [13, 12] is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related proble...
F. Javier Thayer, Jonathan C. Herzog, Joshua D. Gu...
In a society increasingly concerned with the steady assault on electronic privacy, the need for privacy-preserving techniques is both natural and justified. This need extends to t...
We present the adaptation of our model for the validation of key distribution and authentication protocols to address specific needs of protocols for electronic commerce. The two ...
We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject o...
We study the problem of "privacy amplification": key agreement between two parties who both know a weak secret w, such as a password. (Such a setting is ubiquitous on th...