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» Social Choice, Merging, and Elections
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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
138views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 6 months ago
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
PKC
2007
Springer
144views Cryptology» more  PKC 2007»
14 years 1 months ago
Traceable Ring Signature
Abstract. The ring signature allows a signer to leak secrets anonymously, without the risk of identity escrow. At the same time, the ring signature provides great flexibility: No ...
Eiichiro Fujisaki, Koutarou Suzuki
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 13 days ago
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...
Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm
AAAI
2010
13 years 8 months ago
Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules
In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs t...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
SIGECOM
2011
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2011»
12 years 9 months ago
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
In many settings, a group of agents must come to a joint decision on multiple issues. In practice, this is often done by voting on the issues in sequence. In this paper, we model ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme ...