We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other ...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, And...
We study here the effect of concurrent greedy moves of players in atomic congestion games where n selfish agents (players) wish to select a resource each (out of m resources) so ...
Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spira...
Abstract. Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can co...
Edith Elkind, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Nicholas R. J...
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency ...
Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Maria Polukar...
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple game...
Rudolf Berghammer, Stefan Bolus, Agnieszka Rusinow...