We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...
Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbi...
Abstract. This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first ord...
We describe CoSP, a general framework for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic models and for embedding these proofs into formal calculi. CoSP considers arbitrary...