A communication channel from an honest sender A to an honest receiver B can be described as a system with three interfaces labeled A, B, and E (the adversary), respectively, where...
We describe CoSP, a general framework for conducting computational soundness proofs of symbolic models and for embedding these proofs into formal calculi. CoSP considers arbitrary...
We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventiona...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Bogdan...
We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptographic attacks including concurrent protocol runs. This proof is based on an abstract crypt...
Traditional security protocols are mainly concerned with key establishment and principal authentication and rely on predistributed keys and properties of cryptographic operators. I...
David A. Basin, Srdjan Capkun, Patrick Schaller, B...