Ballester has shown that the problem of deciding whether a Nash stable partition exists in a hedonic game with arbitrary preferences is NP-complete. In this paper we will prove tha...
The core of a cooperative game contains all stable distributions of a coalition’s gains among its members. However, some games have an empty core, with every distribution being ...
Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Dorota Marciniak...
Abstract. We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest ...
The coalition formation process, in which a number of independent, autonomous agents come together to act as a collective, is an important form of interaction in multi-agent system...