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» Stable partitions in coalitional games
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ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments
Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered i...
Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Yasufumi Satoh, Atsu...
AI
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish thing...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 27 days ago
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish thing...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
CORR
2010
Springer
197views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 6 months ago
Hedonic Coalition Formation for Distributed Task Allocation among Wireless Agents
—Autonomous wireless agents such as unmanned aerial vehicles, mobile base stations, or self-operating wireless nodes present a great potential for deployment in next-generation w...
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Basar, Mérouane ...
CORR
2010
Springer
144views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 7 months ago
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
We conduct a computational analysis of partitions in additively separable hedonic games that satisfy standard criteria of fairness and optimality. We show that computing a partiti...
Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig