The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...
Christos H. Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
Deterministic optimization approaches have been well developed and widely used in the process industry to accomplish off-line and on-line process optimization. The challenging tas...
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...
Certain observable features (tags), shared by a group of similar agents, can be used to signal intentions and can be effectively used to infer unobservable properties. Such infere...