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ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
Kate Larson
CORR
2002
Springer
108views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 9 months ago
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has receive...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh
IAT
2009
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
Extending Alternating-Offers Bargaining in One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Settings
Automating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studie...
Bo An, Nicola Gatti, Victor R. Lesser
AAAI
2010
13 years 11 months ago
Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting
Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of...
Yiling Chen, John Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. P...