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» Strategic Deception in Agents
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WINE
2009
Springer
178views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 4 months ago
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies
We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project. The action taken by each agent...
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A statistical relational model for trust learning
We address the learning of trust based on past observations and context information. We argue that from the truster's point of view trust is best expressed as one of several ...
Achim Rettinger, Matthias Nickles, Volker Tresp
SODA
2012
ACM
278views Algorithms» more  SODA 2012»
12 years 1 days ago
Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
A Nash Equilibrium is a joint strategy profile at which each agent myopically plays a best response to the other agents’ strategies, ignoring the possibility that deviating fro...
Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett, Yish...
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 7 months ago
Game Theory with Costly Computation: Formulation and Application to Protocol Security
: We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resu...
Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
ATAL
2009
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
Team competition
In a team competition, two participating teams have an equal number of players, and each team orders its players linearly based on their strengths. A mechanism then specifies how...
Pingzhong Tang, Yoav Shoham, Fangzhen Lin