We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auc...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...
Recently, Jain, Mahdian and Saberi [5] had given a FPTAS for the problem of computing a market equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu setting, when the utilities are linear functions. The...
Abstract. We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, ou...
Peter Bro Miltersen, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Nikos Tr...
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resul...
We present a new multiagent learning algorithm, RVσ(t), that builds on an earlier version, ReDVaLeR . ReDVaLeR could guarantee (a) convergence to best response against stationary ...