As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
Abstract. In this work, we consider singleton congestion games as a special class of (weighted) congestion games where each players' strategy consists only of a single resourc...
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. ...
The price of anarchy (POA) is a worst-case measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a g...
Abstract. Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the ...