—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...
Abstract. We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions ar...
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to “seed” the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a s...
Motivated by an application in highway pricing, we consider the problem that consists in setting profit-maximizing tolls on a clique subset of a multicommodity transportation net...