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INFOCOM
2006
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
Bottleneck Routing Games in Communication Networks
—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
Ron Banner, Ariel Orda
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
96views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
14 years 2 months ago
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...
IOR
2007
89views more  IOR 2007»
13 years 8 months ago
Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
Abstract. We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions ar...
José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicol&aa...
STOC
2012
ACM
256views Algorithms» more  STOC 2012»
11 years 11 months ago
Competitive contagion in networks
We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to “seed” the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a s...
Sanjeev Goyal, Michael Kearns
DISOPT
2011
176views Education» more  DISOPT 2011»
13 years 2 days ago
Valid inequalities and branch-and-cut for the clique pricing problem
Motivated by an application in highway pricing, we consider the problem that consists in setting profit-maximizing tolls on a clique subset of a multicommodity transportation net...
Géraldine Heilporn, Martine Labbé, P...