We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
We consider the price of selfish routing in terms of tradeoffs and from an average-case perspective. Each player in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by...
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
Dimitris Fotakis, Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. ...